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THE MULTISTATE CONSUMER CLASS ACTION:
LOCAL SOLUTIONS, NATIONAL PROBLEMS
ALLEN

I.

R. KAmp*

Introduction

The question of whether a state court may entertain a class action that includes
class members from many states was expected to be answered by the Supreme Court
in Gillette Co. v. Miner.' After hearing oral argument, however, the Court decided
that it did not have jurisdiction because there was no final judgment.2 This disposition left undecided the problem presented by Gillette: How to provide a forum
adequate to adjudicate claims arising from a nationwide consumer promotion
scheme?
The solution offered by the state of Illinois is a state class action that includes
as plaintiffs all the alleged victims of the scheme wherever located. This Article
argues that in doing so, the Illinois courts are acting unconstitutionally in that they
seek to bind the class members adversely. According to the Constitution, a grant
of relief to out-of-state class members in a state consumer class action should not
bar them from subsequent actions in other forums. On the other hand, allowing
subsequent actions is unfair to the defendant's interests in having all claims against
it adjudicated in one final action. This Article suggests that a federal forum would
provide a better solution.

II. GILLETTE CO. V. MINER
Although there have been other nationwide class actions that have been entertained in state court, 3 Gillette presents the problem in a unique form. In several
other cases involving state class actions, it has been thought that if the subject
matter of the suit is local in nature, the state with a special relationship to that
matter could entertain a nationwide class suit. In Daarv. Yellow Cab,' for example, the class consisted of those who suffered excessive taxicab charges in the Los
Angeles area. By definition, all class claims related to California in that they arose
out of taxi rides in California. Another example is Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers
Corp.,' which involved a nationwide class of retired employees of a Wisconsin cor*Associate Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School; A.B., University of California at Berkeley,
1964; M.A., University of California at Irvine, 1967; J.D., University of Chicago, 1969.
' Gillette Co. v. Miner, 87 Ill. 2d 7, 428 N.E.2d 478 (1981), cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 86 (1982).
2 Gillette, 459 U.S. 86 (1982).
See, e.g., Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Corp., 222 Kan. 527, 567 P.2d 1292 (1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1068 (1978) (Shutts I). There the Kansas court entertained a class suit brought to enforce
interest payments or royalties earned from an oil and gas field located primarily in that state, although
the majority of the class members were not Kansas residents. 222 Kan. at 532, 558, 567 P.2d at 1298,
1315. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a different case with the same name and similar
facts. Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Corp., 235 Kan. 195, 679 P.2d 1159 (1984), cert. granted, 105 S.
Ct. 242 (1984) (Shutts II).
I Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 86 Wis. 2d 226, 271 N.W.2d 879 (1978). A class of retired,
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poration that sued for breach of contract to provide free life insurance benefits.
Gillette, however, grew out of a nationwide sales promotion with no special relationship to Illinois.
In Gillette, a Delaware corporation, with its headquarters in Massachusetts,
offered, in a nationally promoted advertising campaign, to supply a free Accent
table lighter to anyone who sent in proof of purchase of two Cricket lighters with
fifty cents for postage and handling to a "fulfillment house' 6 in Minnesota.7 In
all, there were approximately 450,000 orders, 200,000 lighters on hand, 70,000 subsequently assembled in response to the demand, and 180,000 unfilled orders. Forty
percent of the requests thus were not met. Gillette wrote letters of apology to each
of the disappointed 180,000 persons stating that the supplies had been exhausted,
returning the fifty cents together with a Cricket lighter.
The suggested retail price of Accent lighters is $7.95; for Cricket lighters, $1.10.
Assuming that the failure to receive one's lighter is a legally recompensible harm,
the damages are the amount of failed expectations, $7.95, the price of the Accent
lighter; or the difference between the Cricket lighter and the Accent, $6.85. Individually, the amount is trivial, but with a class of 180,000 disappointed participants,
the damages equal $1,431,000 or $1,233,000.8
Steven Miner, one of the would-be Accent recipients, filed a class action in
the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, alleging breach of contract and violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act., Subsequently, plaintiff alleged that:
Notwithstanding the fact that defendant Gillette soon after its promotional campaign was initiated became aware of the fact that it would not have an adequate
supply of Accent table lighters available to fill orders received from members of
the public accepting defendant's unconditional offer, it fraudulently and deceptively
concealed such fact from prospective purchasers by continuing to extensively advertise

and promote its "free" Cricket promotional offer, taking no steps to acquire an
additional supply of Accent table lighters nor withdrawing its offer."

Miner filed pursuant to the Illinois class action statute," which provides that
there may be a class action where "there are questions of fact or law common

salaried, nonunion employees sued for breach of contract for free life insurance benefits for those over
65. The representation that free insurance was to be given and the decision to change the plan were
made in Allis-Chalmers' home office in Wisconsin. The company's corporate headquarters was in Wisconsin and had long done business there. Id., 86 Wis. 2d at 240, 242-43, 271 N.W.2d at 886-87.
1 A business that fills the orders.
7 Gillette, 87 Ill. 2d at 21, 428 N.E.2d at 486 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
Brief for Petitioner at 2, 3, Gillette, 87 Ill.
2d 7, 428 N.E.2d 478.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, §§ 261-72 (Supp. 1979).
Brief for Respondent at 2, Gillette, 87 Ill.
2d 7, 428 N.E.2d 478.
"ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 57.2 (1979) (recodified as ch. 110, § 2-801 to -806 (1982)).
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to the class, which common questions predominate over any questions affecting
individual members." 2 The court shall "describe those whom the court finds to
be members of the class."' 3 Any judgment in the class is then binding on all members
of the class except those who have "opted out."'"
The proposed class included all persons nationwide who had requested an Accent
lighter pursuant to the promotion but had not received one.' 5 It consisted of about
12,000 residents of Illinois and an additional 168,000 would-be recipients who were
from every other state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Canada. 6
On defendant's motion to dismiss the class, the trial court dismissed the nonresident class members, leaving a class of Illinois residents only. The issue of the propriety of maintaining the class action on behalf of the non-Illinois residents was
certified for immediate appeal. The dismissal of the nonresident class members was
affirmed' 7 by the Illinois Appellate Court; however, the Illinois Supreme Court,
although affirming the denial of the motion to dismiss the class action as to Illinois
residents, reversed the lower court's dismissal of the nonresident class and remanded
the case for further proceedings.' 8 Gillette's subsequent petition to the United States
Supreme Court for certiorari was granted, but after oral argument, the Court
dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds for lack of a final judgment.' 9 After
this dismissal, the case was remanded to the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois.
Subclasses were then certified. Residents of forty-five states were divided into three
subclasses according to the nature of the states' consumer protection laws. Each
remaining jurisdiction formed its own subclass. There was no record of any other
20
action in any other court arising out of the Accent table lighter promotion.
Whether the United States Supreme Court was correct in dismissing the writ
of certiorari is a question beyond the scope of this Article. In any event, the awaited
word from the Court on nationwide state class actions was not forthcoming.
As noted earlier, this Article suggests that constitutional and other problems
created by nationwide state class actions could be avoided by providing for adjudication of these matters in a federal forum. The balance of this Article will
discuss constitutional objections to nationwide state class actions; will review specific
state and federal class action precedents; will discuss modern jurisdictional doctrines; and will critique the Court's use of federalism.
Id. at § 2-801(2).
," Id. at § 2-802(a).
14 Id. at § 2-805.
,1Brief for Petitioner at 3, Gillette, 87 Ill. 2d 7, 428 N.E.2d 478.
16 Gillette, 87 Il1. 2d at 21, 428 N.E.2d at 486 (1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
,1Gillette, 89 Ill. App. 3d 315, 411 N.E.2d 1092 (1980). The appellate court at first refused to
hear the case but was reversed by the Illinois Supreme Court.
Gillette, 87 Ill. 2d 7, 428 N.E.2d 478 (1981).
" Gillette, 459 U.S. 86 (writ of certiorari dismissed for want of jurisdiction).
20 Brief for Respondent at 2, Gillette, 87 Ill. 2d 7, 428 N.E.2d 478.
12
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS

Understanding the nationwide state class action requires an appreciation of
jurisdictional limitations in federal courts. Consumer class actions such as Gillette
which do not involve a federal question must now be brought in state court because
of Snyder v. Harris' and Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co.22 These two cases held
that in a class action suit each individual class member must meet the amount in
controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction in federal court. Thus, in a situation such as Gillette, in which each member has a small amount of damages, the
case cannot be tried in federal court.
The constitutional challenge to having one state adjudicate the rights of a
nationwide class is based on two objections: the possible deprivation of a class
member's due process rights and the conflict of such a procedure with the allocation of judicial power among the states based on our system of federalism.
The due process argument addresses the possible destruction of the class
members' right to sue. Under the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure an unsuccessful
result for the plaintiff class (or any result giving the class less than the maximum
relief possible) would bar the class members from suing again:
Any judgment entered in a class action brought under Section 2-801 of the Act
shall be binding on all class members, as the class is defined by the court, except
those who have been properly excluded [under the opt-out
provision] from the class
23
under subsection (b) of Section 2-804 of this Act.

21 Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) (class members' claims that were individually under
the $10,000 amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction could not be aggregated to
meet the jurisdictional amount).
21 Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973). (district court cannot exercise pendent
or ancillary jurisdiction over those individual claims that do not meet the jurisdictional amount, even
where the named plaintiffs do satisfy the amount in controversy requirement).
23 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-805 (1982). Illinois law provides that notice and an opt-out right
be given to each class member:
Notice in class cases. Upon a determination that an action may be maintained as a class
action, or at any time during the conduct of the action, the court in its discretion may order
such notice that it deems necessary to protect the interests of the class and the parties.

An order entered under subsection (a) of Section 2-802 of this Act, determining that
an action may be maintained as a class action, may be conditioned upon the giving of such
notice as the court deems appropriate.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-803 (1982).

(b) Exclusion. Any class member seeking to be excluded from a class action may request
such exclusion and any judgment entered in the action shall not apply to persons who properly request to be excluded. P.A. 82-280.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-804(b) (1982). The Illinois Supreme Court held in Gillette that, where
the identity and address of each class member is readily accessible, notice to each class member informing the member of the right to opt-out was mandatory. Gillette, 87 I11.2d at 15, 428 N.E.2d at 482-83.
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Under case law, class members are also bound by res judicata.2 ' Collateral estoppel
also binds the members on any finding of fact or conclusions of law adjudicated
in class action. 25
One's cause of action, however, is a protected property right under the fourteenth amendment. 26 Thus the question is whether Illinois constitutionally can take
away a class member's property right in a cause of action without personal jurisdiction over him. Since Pennoyer v. Neff 7 personal jurisdiction has been required
to take a defendant's property right. Gillette poses the question of whether personal jurisdiction is required where plaintiff's rights are at issue.
Assuming that personal jurisdiction is required to bind the plaintiff class, the
question becomes one of the appropriate standard of jurisdiction. Today's standard of "minimum contacts" was created to deal with problems of jurisdiction
over defendants 2 but the minimum contact standard has never been used to decide
issues of jurisdiction over plaintiffs. Perhaps a different standard than minimum
contacts would be appropriate here.
Any objection to a nationwide state class action based on due process rights
could be met by not binding the class to any adverse judgment. In this way a class
member could share in any relief granted but would not be barred from seeking
additional relief. Although such a system would prove unfair to the defendants,
it is not unconstitutional. The federal precursor to rule 23 allowed for a system
in which plaintiffs were not bound by an adverse judgment, but could opt-in if
the judgment were favorable.2 9 Moreover, by the Supreme Court's rejection of
mutuality of estoppel, a class of beneficiaries is created who may use a favorable

24 See generally Braveman, Class Certification in State Court Welfare Litigation:A Request for
ProceduralJustice, 28 Butn'Ao L. REv. 57 (1979). See, e.g., Goff v. Menke, 672 F.2d 702 (8th Cir.
1982); Dosier v. Miami Valley Broadcasting, 656 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1981); Nathan v. Rowan, 651
F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1981); Laskey v. UAW, 638 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1981); Robertson v. NBA, 622
F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1980); Bronson v. Board of Education, 525 F.2d 344 (6th Cir. 1975) cert. denied,
425 U.S. 934 (1976); Wren v. Smith, 410 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1969); see also Annot., 48 A.L.R. FED.
675 (1980).
23 E.g., Bronson, 525 F.2d 344; Laskey, 683 F.2d 954.

20

Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982). The Illinois Supreme Court held that

the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission had to hold a factfinding conference within 120
days of bringing a charge of employment discrimination in order for the charge to be heard. The Court
held that such dismissals violated the due process and equal protection clauses. In doing so, the Court
held that "a cause of action is a species of property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause." Logan, 455 U.S. at 428. See also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Societe
Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306 (1950).
27 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
2" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (applied the minimum contacts
standard to determine whether the state of Washington could exercise jurisdiction over a defendant).
29 See 3B J. MooRE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.1113] (2d ed. 1984).
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result in one litigation to sue or defend a loser in subsequent litigation.30 Thus,
there is a "beneficial class," created by the collateral estoppel doctrine, that may
use the prior litigation to its benefit and yet cannot be detrimentally affected by
any adverse determination because they have not had their day in court. 2 Such
a procedure presents a "heads I win, tails you lose" situation to the estoppel
party, but its constitutionality has not been questioned in modern times. Therefore,
any constitutional objection to the nationwide class action on the basis that it is
depriving class members of their right to sue could be met by ruling that any decision is to be beneficial only.
The other constitutional issue raised by Gillette, that of federalism, goes beyond
individual due process concerns. May an individual state adjudicate the rights of
other states residents under our federal system? World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson3" states that the jurisdictional requirement of minimum contacts "acts
to ensure that the states, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits
imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system." 33 Does
our federal system permit a state to make a nationwide adjudication as sought in
Gillette?
IV. REVIEW OF THE SPECIFIC PRECEDENT
An analysis of the specific precedent indicates that the inclusion of nonresident
class members in the adjudication of a nonlocal cause of action does go beyond
past authority.
A.

Cases That Adjudicate Rights Through Representation

The class adjudication is a type of binding through representation: the court
binds the class members in an action brought by a representative. If the court has
jurisdiction over a representative, such as the named plaintiff, does it need jurisdiction over the represented class members?
In 1912, the Supreme Court ruled that a state could not so bind a party. Bigelow
v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co." held that a New York court
could not bind a Massachusetts defendant through privity. The plaintiff's suit against
30

Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).

After the Court's decision in Blonder-Tongue and Parklane, the victory of an unrelated
plaintiff or defendant-a "stranger"-opens up two "classes" of beneficiaries: an offensive
"

class of "other plaintiffs" who can share in an earlier plaintiff's victory over a common
defendant, and a defensive class of "other defendants" who can share in an earlier defen-

dant's victory over a common plaintiff.
George, Sweet Uses of Adversity: Parklane Hosiery and the CollateralClass Action, 32 STAN. L. REv.
655, 656-57 (1980).
" World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
Id. at 292.
',Bigelow v. Old Dominion Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912).
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a joint tortfeasor located in New York was dismissed, and the plaintiff then sought
to sue Bigelow, the other tortfeasor, who was located in Massachusetts. The question was whether the Massachusetts defendant could set up the New York judgment as a bar. Since mutuality of estoppel then applied, the plaintiff would be
bound by the prior loss only if the Massachusetts defendant would have been bound
if the litigation had gone the other way. The question then was whether that defendant would have been so bound. The Court stated that:
The New York court had no jurisdiction to render judgment in personam against
Bigelow. He was confessedly not a party. He did not voluntarily appear. He had
no legal right to appear, no right to introduce evidence, control the proceedings,
nor appeal from the judgment. To say that nevertheless the judgment rendered
there adverse to the plaintiff in that case may be pleaded by him as a bar to another
suit by the same plaintiff upon the same facts, because such is the effect of that
judgment by the usage or law of New York, would be to give the law of New
York an extra-territorial effect, which would operate as a denial of due process
of law."
Whether Bigelow remains good law is questionable. A more expansive view
is taken by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, which states that personal
jurisdiction is not necessary to adjudicate the rights of individuals represented in
an action. If a court has personal jurisdiction over a party, it has jurisdiction over
every person that party represents: "A person represented by a party to an action
is bound by the judgment even though the person himself does not have notice
'36
of the action, is not served with process, or is not subject to service of process."
The RESTATEMENT'S position has been criticized by Professor McCoid, who
argues that the standards for personal jurisdiction should be more stringent in
representation cases than in cases where one is suing on his or her own behalf:
It makes no sense to me to say that a court without authority to adjudicate directly
against one as a party has authority to bind him indirectly as a nonparty. And
if the response is that the court has jurisdiction over one with whom the nonparty
Id. at 137.
§ 41(2) (1982). comment (f) This section states:
Represented person beyond jurisdictionof court. Participation through a representative
implies that it is unnecessary for the represented person himself to be before the court. As
'

RESTATEimr (SEcoND) oF THE LAW OF JuDGmENTs

stated in paragraph (2), it is therefore immaterial that the represented person had no notice
of the suit (unless such notice was required in connection with appointment of the representative, see § 42(1)(a)), or was beyond the reach of the court's process. Sometimes a representative is constituted to act only with reference to property or transactions within the territorial limits of the forum's jurisdiction, as in the case of an ancillary administrator. Such
a limitation of authority stems from the limited purposes for which the representative is
designated, however, and not from the fact that the represented person is beyond the court's
reach of jurisdiction. With respect to the limited purposes of the representation, the judgment in such a proceeding is effective to bind the represented person even though he himself
cannot be subjected to the jurisdiction of the court.
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is in privity, then the scope of privity becomes directly suspect: authority to adjudicate and opportunity to be heard, both governed by due process, are at stake. 7
The RESTATEMENT'S conclusion becomes even more suspect in a class action.
Most nonclass representatives are in some way voluntarily selected by a party or
that party's predecessor in interest. The examples given by the RESTATEmENT involve such consent. A trustee, for example, is selected by the settlor of a trust
and then represents the beneficiary. Another example, "an official or agency invested by law with authority to represent the person's interests" 38 is chosen in a
democracy by the governed. The "managing officers of an unincorporated
association ' "39 are generally elected. A class representative, however, is self-appointed.
The class members have not, nor have any of their predecessors in interest, affirmatively consented in any way to the named plaintiffs being their representatives.
Another citation of the RESTATEMENT is to "the cases involving representation
of unborn remainderman. ' 40 Jurisdiction over unborn property owners is based
on necessity, because future generations necessarily are affected by decisions made
today without their consent or presence.
Adjudication through representation in a class action thus presents a different
problem from other representative adjudication. The problem of jurisdiction through
representation in the class action has been previously decided-but never in a context resembling Gillette.
B.

State Nationwide Class Actions: Local Subject Matter

Traditionally, state nationwide class actions have involved matters localized
in a particular jurisdiction. In these cases, the localized nature of the subject matter
creates ties between the class members and the forum, which in turn supports a
finding of minimum contacts between the class members and the forum. One common circumstance involving the nationwide class is that of the "common fund"
where claimants from several states claim an interest in property located in one
state. Frequently, state and federal courts reorganize the common fund of an insurance company or fraternal benefit society to adjust the rights of shareholders
and policyholders.' In such cases, the state has a strong interest in adjudicating

" McCoid, A Single Packagefor Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REV. 707, 713 (1976). See
also Fisch, Common-Question Class Action, 38 Mo. L. REv. 173, 212 (1973).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41(l)(d) at 393.
Id., comment b, at 395.
Id., reporter's note, at 405.
4" See, e.g., Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs, 237 U.S. 662 (1915); Carpenter v. Pacific Mut.
Life
Ins. Co., 10 Cal. 2d 307, 74 P.2d 761 (1937), aff'd sub nom.; Neblett v. Carpenter, 305 U.S. 297
(1938); Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66 (1938); Supreme Tribe
of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237
U.S. 531 (1915). Mullane can also be seen as a common fund case-the trustee was seeking an order
approving his dealings with the New York trust fund and was permitted to bind out of state beneficiaries
if he gave adequate notice.
"
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the matter. These cases, moreover, comport with the modern minimum contacts

test asserted by Shaffer v. Heitner.4 2 In Shaffer it was stated that the state in which
property is located can adjudicate the rights of those who claim an interest in that

property because the claiming of property amounts to a submission to that state's
jurisdiction."3 In the cases reorganizing insurance companies, those claiming an interest in a company domiciled in a state can be said to be "purposefully availing
themselves" of the protection of that state's laws. In these localized actions,

minimum contacts between the class members and the forum can be seen.
Another category of state class actions is the type of consumer action exemplified
by Daar v. Yellow Cab" in which the class consisted of those who suffered excessive taxicab charges in the Los Angeles area. By definition, all class members
had minimum contacts with California because all had been overcharged in California. Another example is Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers Corp.4 which involved a nationwide class of employees of a Wisconsin corporation. All employees had some

relation to Wisconsin.
"

Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
The case for applying to jurisdiction in rem the same test of "fair play and substantial
justice" as governs assertions of jurisdiction in personam is simple and straightforward. It
phrase, 'judicial jurisdiction over a thing,' is a customary
is premised on recognition that "It]he
elliptical way of referring to jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 56, Introductory Note (1971) (hereinafter RasTATEMENT). This recognition leads to the conclusion that in order to justify an exercise of jurisdiction in rem, the basis for jurisdiction must be sufficient to justify exercising "jurisdiction
over the interests of persons in a thing." The standard for determining whether an exercise
of jurisdiction over the interests of persons is consistent with the Due Process Clause is the
minimum contacts standard elucidated in International Shoe.
This argument, of course, does not ignore the fact that the presence of property in a
State may bear on the existence of jurisdiction by providing contacts among the forum State,
the defendant, and the litigation. For example, when claims to the property itself are the
source of the underlying controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant, it would be
unusual for the State where the property is located not to have jurisdiction. In such cases,
the defendant's claim to property located in the State would normally indicate that he expected to benefit from the State's protection of his interest. The State's strong interests in
assuring the marketability of property within its borders and in providing a procedure for
peaceful resolution of disputes about the possession of that property would also support jurisdiction, as would the likelihood that important records and witnesses will be found in the State.
The presence of property may also favor jurisdiction in cases such as suits for injury suffered
on the land of an absentee owner, where the defendant's ownership of the property is conceded but the cause of action is otherwise related to rights and duties growing out of that
ownership.
4'

It appears, therefore, that jurisdiction over many types of actions which now are or might
be brought in rem would not be affected by a holding that any assertion of state-court jurisdiction must satisfy the InternationalShoe standard.
Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207.
4 Daar, 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1978).
41 Schlosser, 86 Wis. 2d 226, 271 N.W.2d 879. See supra note 5. The result in Schlosser may
be questioned in light of Shaffer. A corporation having a director or offices in Delaware did not support jurisdiction in Delaware.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1985

9

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 5
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

Two Kansas cases, both entitled Shutts v. PhillipsPetroleum Co.,46 went further than the Daar-type class action. Royalty owners, in both cases, as a class sued
Phillips Petroleum for interest on certain oil and gas royalties held by Phillips.
The oil and gas royalties were earned on gas produced in the "Hugoton-Anardarko"
gas producing region, which is primarily within Kansas. Of the class members, only
a few were Kansas residents and few of the individual leases were located within
that state. The Kansas court ruled, however, that it had jurisdiction to determine
the right of the non-Kansas class members. The Shutts cases did not involve a common fund located in Kansas, nor did their non-Kansas class members have dealings
in Kansas. Yet they may be distinguished from Gillette in that the gas producing
7
region was located in Kansas.1
Thus, a nonlocal subject matter such as in Gillette never before has been held
to support a nationwide class. Dicta approving a nationwide state class action,
however, was given in Hansberry v. Lee. 41 That case involved the validity of a
racially restrictive covenant covering a Chicago neighborhood. The covenant by
its terms was to be valid if ninety-five percent of the area's property owners had
signed it. It was argued in Hansberry that the validity of the covenant had been
established in a prior class action, Burke v. Kleiman," brought by property owners
in the area covered by the covenant. The Court held that the defendant was not
bound by the prior lawsuit because his interests had not been "adequately
represented." The Court stated that:
It is a principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one

is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated
as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process....
To these general rules there is a recognized exception that, to an extent not

precisely defined by judicial opinion, the judgment in a "class" or "representative"
"4Shutts II, 105 S. Ct. 242. It is important to note that the Court could approve the Shutts
H class action, because of the relation of the subject matter to Kansas, without necessarily approving
of the Gillette class action. A decision reversing Shutts, however, would a fortiori reject Gillette. See
Comment, Civil Procedure: In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Plaintiffs in Multistate Class
Actions, 17 VAssEjt N L.J 382 (1978); Note, Multistate Class Actions: Jurisdiction and Certification,
92 HARv. L. REv. 718 (1979); Note, Toward a Policy-Based Theory of State Court Jurisdiction Over
Class Actions, 56 TExAs L. REv. 1033 (1978).
,' Moreover, the approach of Shutts was not followed in two cases involving consumer class
actions. In Kelmow v. Time, Inc., 352 A.2d 12 (Pa.) cert. denied 429 U.S. 828 (1976), a class action
was brought in Pennsylvania state court to force the continued publication of Life Magazine. The court
limited the action to Pennsylvania residents and those that submitted themselves to the jurisdiction
of the court. In Feldman v. Bates Manufacturing Co., 143 N.J. Super. 84, 362 A.2d 1177 (1976), plaintiffs brought an action in New Jersey state court to compel a corporation to convert preferred stock
into common stock. The corporation had no assets in New Jersey, was not authorized to do business
there, and the majority of stockholders were not New Jersey residents. The court refused to certify
a class, stating that affiliating circumstances or a common fund was not necessary.
, Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
" Burke v. Kleiman, 277 Il. App. 519 (1934).
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suit, to which some members of the class are parties, may bind
members of the
50
class or those represented who were not made parties to

it.

Whether Hansberrymeans that no personal jurisdiction is required in a class
action is debatable; but it is certain that all members of the class discussed in
Hansberryhad minimum contacts with Illinois-they were all property owners in
Chicago.
One explanation reconciling these state class action cases is that a state may
adjudicate the class members' rights where it has an interest in the subject matter
of the transaction or where the subject matter is localized. In Gillette, however,
Illinois had little interest in the transaction with respect to out-of-state residents. The
contract between the Gillette Co. and the out-of-state residents had nothing to do
with Illinois.
The plaintiff in Gillette, however, argued that Illinois did have an interest in
protecting its residents:
The availability of a nationwide class greatly enhances the legal position of an Illinois citizen in a number of ways including the reduction of the costs of litigation

in relation to the potential recovery to the class and the individual Illinois class
member and the ability to attract competent legal counsel on a case which otherwise may not economically warrant a significant expenditure of time or contingent

risk. 5
The plaintiff argued that Illinois also had an interest in policing business within
its borders, an interest that is enhanced by providing a powerful vehicle for redress,
the nationwide class action.2 Plaintiff also argued that by entertaining the litigation, Illinois was making a contribution to the joint effort of all states to provide
53
an effective system of remedial justice.
The problem with this analysis is that it would allow any state with one wouldbe recipient of an Accent lighter to entertain a nationwide class action. In fact,
such a state would have the strongest interest in that it would have a greater need
to join members in the class than if there were many class members in the state.
Gillette represents an extension of the use of multistate class action to a nonlocalized
situation, in which the state has little interest other than giving relief.
C.

Federal Class Actions

Federal class actions present an analogous problem of personal jurisdiction.
The federal courts' response to the problem of jurisdiction over the class members
has largely been one of ignoring the issue or approving a nationwide class. That
response indicates, however, that the normal rules of personal jurisdiction do not
,0 Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 40-41.
" Brief for Respondent at 23, Gillette, 87 Ill. 2d 7, 428 N.E.2d 478 (emphasis in original).
52

Id. at 24.

IId. at 33-34.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1985

11

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 5
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

apply in class actions. Service of process is not required. District courts normally
determine their powers of personal jurisdiction from rule 4, which limits the service of process powers of the district court to that of a state court of the state
in which the district court sits.14 Rule 4 is uniformly ignored in class actions-the
district court assumes personal jurisdiction over the class without mentioning the
rule. Thus the federal cases stand at least for two propositions: (1) Ordinary
limitations of personal jurisdiction do not apply to jurisdiction over class members
in class actions. Personal jurisdiction over class members stems from an inherent
power of the courts. (2) It has never been held that it is unconstitutional for federal
courts to exercise nationwide jurisdictional powers.
One group of federal jurisdiction cases is that dealing with corporate reorganization such as Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble." In these cases the federal district
court has taken jurisdiction over the rights of all beneficiaries and shareholders
wherever located of an organization. Of course, the exercise of personal jurisdiction in these cases can be explained by the "common fund" rationale.

Some recent lower court cases, however, have entertained nationwide classes
1
in nonreorganization situations. 6 In Robertson v. National Basketball Association"
the class consisted of all active players of the NBA. Defendants were granted a
preliminary injunction to prevent Wilt Chamberlain from prosecuting a separate
lawsuit, on the grounds that he was within the present class. The court rejected
Chamberlain's argument of lack of jurisdiction: "Even in defendant class actions,
there is never a question that a court entertaining a proper class action has power
to adjudicate the rights of class members even if they are outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the court when served with notice of the pendency of the action."" 8
R. Civ. P. 4(e):
(e) [Summons]: Service upon Party Not Inhabitant of or Found within State. Whenever
a statute of the United States or an order of court thereunder provides for service of a summons, a notice, or an order in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found
within the state in which the district court is held, service may be made under the circumstances
and in the manner prescribed by the statute or order, or, if there is no provision therein
prescribing the manner of service, in a manner stated in this rule. Whenever a statute or
rule of court of the state in which the district court is held provides (1) for service of a
summons, a notice, or an order in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or
found within the state, or (2) for service upon or notice to him to appear and respond or
defend in an action by reason of the attachment or garnishment or similar seizure of his
property located within the state, service may in either case be made under the circumstances
and in the manner prescribed in the statute or rule ...
14 FED.

Id.
55Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur, 255 U.S. 356; see also cases cited supra note 41.
,6E.g., In re Dalkon Shield IUD Products Liability Litigation, 521 F. Supp. 1188 (N.D. Cal.
1981), rev'd, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. A.H. Robins v. Abed, 103 S.Ct.
817 (1983); Oskoian v. Canuel, 269 F.2d 311 (Ist Cir. 1959); In re Agent Orange Products Liability
Litigation, 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied 104 U.S. 1417 (1984).
S7 Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 413 F. Supp. 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
Id. at 90.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol87/iss2/5
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In Advertising Specialty National Association v. F.T.C., 9 the Federal Trade
Commission sued the Association's members for antitrust violations. The court considered it well settled that "in a proper class suit the fact that all members of the
class are not within the jurisdiction of the court where the suit is tried does not
exempt foreign members from the judgment." ' 60 And in Appleton Electric Co. v.
Advanced-United Expressways,6' the court rejected any necessity of personal jurisdiction over a defendants' class in an action to recover freight charges ruled unlawful
by an I.C.C. order.62
The Supreme Court has never clearly decided the issue. In Christopher v.
Brusselback,63 the Court ruled that jurisdiction was necessary over each defendant.
Creditors of a land bank had sued the bank and its shareholders and won. The
creditors then sought to enforce that judgment in a second suit against stockholders
residing in Ohio who were not served with process in the first action. The Court
noted that it would be possible to draft a statute providing that the corporation
represent all stockholders in the action, but that no such statute existed in the case
at bar. Therefore, in personam jurisdiction over the Ohio defendants was required
to bind them. The Court stated that "[t]he obligation which the statute imposes
upon the stockholders is personal, and petitioners can be held to respond to it only
by a suit maintained in a court having jurisdiction to render a judgment against
them in personam."' 6" The Court ruled that Equity Rule 38 prescribed only the
class action procedure and did not enlarge the district court's jurisdiction. The rule's
"purpose was to prescribe the procedure in equity to be followed in cases within
the jurisdiction of the federal courts and not to enlarge their jurisdiction. '" 6
The application of this language is a matter of controversy. One interpretation
is that personal jurisdiction over each member of a defendant class is necessary.
By analogy, the same jurisdictional requirement should be imposed on adjudication of the interests of members of a plaintiff class. One may distinguish between
plaintiff and defendant class actions. In the former, the class members have less
at risk; they may lose a benefit rather than being detrimentally affected. Thus,
a less stringent jurisdictional standard may be applied in the plaintiff class actions.
However, Christopherinvolved the issue of whether the defendants who were not
served with process were bound by an action against the bank, not against them
as a class. The issue of jurisdiction over class members was not decided by the
Court. As stated by one commentator:

"

Advertising Specialty Nat'l Ass'n v. F.T.C., 238 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1956).

6I Id. at 120.
61 Appleton Elec.

Co. v. Advanced-United Expressways, 494 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1974).
See also In re United States Financial Securities Litigation, 69 F.R.D. 24, 48-52 (S.D. Cal.
1975) (personal jurisdiction over foreign members of plaintiff's class unnecessary to recover for fraud
and negligence of defendant's accounting firm in auditing the issuer of debentures to the plaintiff).
61 Christopher v. Brusselback, 302 U.S. 500 (1938).
6

61

Id.

at 502.

11Id. at 505.
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The shareholders in Christopher-the "absent defendants" to whom the Court

referred-were held not bound by the decree in the prior plaintiff class action against

the corporation only because there was no statute to put defendants on notice that

the corporation would
stand in judgment for them, and there existed no other
jurisdictional nexus. 66
In a more modern case, Califano v. Yamasaki,'67 the court validated a nationwide class action without discussing the personal jurisdiction issue. Yamasaki involved consolidated lawsuits attacking the Secretary of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare's (HEW) recoupment of Social Security overpayments without a hearing. The class included "all individuals eligible for [old age and survivors'
benefits] whose benefits have been or will be reduced or otherwise adjusted without
prior notice and opportunity for hearing."' 8 Nothing in Yamasaki indicates that
the Court was in any way bothered by questions of a district court's personal jurisdiction over class members. The Court in Yamasaki seems to have implicitly rejected
any requirement of personal jurisdiction over class members.
These federal cases can be distinguished from class actions in state courts. First,
the unit of sovereignty is different. The district courts are part of the federal
sovereignty while the state courts are limited by the particular state's sovereignty.
There appears to be no constitutional objection, therefore, to a nationwide class
in a federal district court. There is little disagreement that nationwide service of
process in federal courts is constitutional. 6'9 The federal cases also generally involve
reorganizations which require unitary adjudication, or involve matters of nationwide concern such as the federal social security statutes in Yamasaki. Thus, they
are not direct precedent for allowing nationwide state class actions. Because the
actions are in federal court, there is no conflict with the Court's modern concern
over extension of state personal jurisdiction.
V.

THE

NATIONWIDE STATE CLASS ACTION

MODERN JURISDICTIONAL

AND

DocTmlNu

Because many of the nationwide class action cases are old and were decided
prior to the minimum contacts test of International Shoe v. Washington0 and
because few cases explicitly discuss the issues involved in Gillette, the problem must
be discussed on a more theoretical level, considering the nationwide state class action
in light of the Supreme Court's contemporary personal jurisdiction doctrine. Even
though the Court's personal jurisdiction decisions involve defendants rather than
plaintiffs, the Court's statement of the principles underlying personal jurisdiction
is directly applicable to the problem addressed by this Article.

6

Wolfson, Defendant Class Actions, 38 OH1o ST. L.3. 459, 465 (1977).

"7Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979).
Id. at 689.
69 See, e.g., C. WRiGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
70 InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. 310.
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In World-Wide Volkswagen,7 ' the Court explicitly described the function of
the present jurisdictional test of minimum contacts: (1) "[i]t
protects the defendant
against the burdens of litigation in a distant or inconvenient forum" and (2) it
serves values of federalism, ensuring "that the States, through their courts, do not
reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns
in a federal system."" Of these two functions, that of federalism is paramount:
the due process clause, "acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may
sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment '" 3 even
where convenience factors would support jurisdiction. Thus, modem personal
jurisdiction doctrine has been characterized by two concerns: federalism and the
relation between the defendant and the forum.
A. Considerations of Fairness and Convenience with a Bias for the
Defendant
The purpose of the minimum contacts test is to protect the defendant from
inconvenient litigation. In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court stated "the burden
on the defendant, while always a primary concern, will in an appropriate case be
considered in light of other relevant factors...." 7 4 Factors the Court listed included
the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, efficient resolution of controversies, and
the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies. 75 World-Wide Volkswagen, nevertheless, emphasizes that after state
sovereignty, the convenience of the defendant is the "primary concern" of jurisdictional analysis.
Although considerations of federalism have a direct relevance to the multistate
class actions, factors of convenience seem irrelevant. Members of a plaintiff class
are not, like defendants, forced to appear at trial, hire attorneys, and attend depositions in a distant forum; rather, they need only sit back and let the class representatives do the work. In fact, in a rule 23(b)(1) or (2) action, they may never know
that a class action is proceeding that is adjudicating their rights.
B.

The Concern for Federalism

The federalism concern in personal jurisdiction is an expression of the Supreme
Court's present commitment to state's rights.76 These concerns are especially rele"

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. 286.

"

Id. at 292.

Id. at 294 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251, 254 (1958)).
Id. at 292.
71Id. (citations omitted).
76 For good discussions of the Burger Court's federalism see Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist:
A Preliminary View, 90 HAgv. L. REv. 293 (1976); Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and
Federalism, 90 H~av. L. R-v. 1133 (1976); Note, Rizzo v. Goode: The Burger Court's Continuing
Assault on Federal Jurisdiction, 30 RUTGERs L. Rsv. 103 (1976).
14
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vant in weighing the plaintiff's argument in favor of Illinois jurisdiction that is
based on an "interstate venue" concept of personal jurisdiction. The interstate venue
concept contemplates the states as parts of a coordinated whole, in which the system
composed of all the state courts can adjudicate controversies governed by state
law. It asks the question: Which is the best state in which to adjudicate the
controversy?
The use of the interstate venue concept supports jurisdiction in Illinois. The
plaintiff in Gillette argued that by accepting the case for adjudication, the Illinois
courts were only taking on part of their shared responsibility for adjudicating statelaw based lawsuits. As stated by the plaintiff:
The Illinois Supreme Court considered the burden it was imposing on the Illinois
court system in allowing the trial court to maintain this relatively straightforward
and eminently feasible and manageable class action. The court also realized the
duty it was undertaking, for, as Professor Hazard once wrote: "A state court system
of remedial justice that is actually effective is a legitimate objective to which each
state may pro tanto make contribution.""
Under such a theory, it does not matter which state adjudicates the nationwide
class-Illinois may do it for Gillette, Kansas will do it for Shutts," while another
state will do it for the next case that arises. In so doing, each state is adding its
help to the nationwide system of state court justice.
The Court, however, by concentrating on state sovereignty and federalism has
rejected the "interstate venue" test. In World-Wide Volkswagen it ruled:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced
to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a strong
interest in applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most
convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument
of interstate federalism,
may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render
79
a valid judgment.
In rejecting the interstate venue approach, the Court has focused on the defendant's activities. In Shaffer v. Heitner,"° for example, the Court looked at the relaticn of the directors and officers of Greyhound to Delaware rather than to
Delaware's interest in regulating and giving relief for wrongful actions of fiduciaries
of Delaware corporations. World-Wide Volkswagen8 and Rush v. Savchuk12 returned the focus to the defendant, not to the transaction underlying the suit. In Savchuk,
" Brief for Respondent at 33-34, Gillette, 87 11M.
2d 7, 428 N.E.2d 478 quoting Hazard, A General
Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 241, 282, n.147.
Shutts, 222 Kan. 527, 567 P.2d 1292 (1977).
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 294 (citing Hanson 357 U.S. at 251, 254).
-0 Shaffer, 433 U.S. 186.
"
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. 286.
'
Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol87/iss2/5
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Justice Marshall disapproved of Minnesota's "subtle shift in focus from the defendant to the plaintiff."' 83 The Court also emphasized that Minnesota's aggregation
of both defendants' contacts was unconstitutional. The minimum contacts test had
to be met as to each defendant.84
World-Wide Volkswagen follows this restrictive test even more closely. It looks
solely at the relation of the dealer and the distributor to Oklahoma. Oklahoma,
not New York, had the greater relationship with the lawsuit: the automobile accident occurred in Oklahoma, the injuries took place in Oklahoma, the law of
Oklahoma was the law of the case, the hospital records and treating physicians
were in Oklahoma, and the plaintiffs were in Oklahoma at the time the suit was
filed. In fact, the only relation of the State of New York to the suit was that it
was the place of sale of the automobile. The Court, however, only looking at the
contacts of the defendants, ruled that they could not be sued in Oklahoma. The
formulation of the issue, then, was a narrow one focusing on the activities of the
defendant, a unilateral jurisdictional test rather than the multifactored test of interstate venue.
Three cases decided at the end of the 1983-84 Term, Keeton v. HustlerMagazine,
Inc.," Calder v. Jones,"6and HelicopterosNacionales de Columbia v. Hall,7 continue this narrow formulation. In Calder, the Court stated that "[p]etitioners are
correct that their contacts with California are not to be judged according to their
employer's activities there. On the other hand, their status as employees does not
somehow insulate them from jurisdiction. Each defendant's contacts with the forum
state must be assessed individually." ' 88
In Keeton, the Court found that the regular sale of thousands of magazines
in New Hampshire was enough to subject Hustler Magazine to personal jurisdiction in New Hampshire. The Court stated that "New Hampshire also has a substantial interest in cooperating with other States, through the 'single publication rule,'
to provide, in a unitary proceeding, a forum for efficiently litigating all issues and
damage claims arising out of a libel. This rule reduces the potential serious drain
of libel cases on judicial resources. It also serves to protect defendants from harassment resulting from multiple suits."8' 9
Although Keeton does recognize a state interest in cooperating with other states,
such an interest is only relevant after determining that there exists a relationship
between the defendant and the forum. The Court did consider New Hampshire's
Id. at 332.
Id. at 332-33.
:5 Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984).
86 Calder v. Jones, 104 S. Ct. 1482 (1984).
, Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall, 104 S. Ct. 1868 (1984).
:3

4

S

Calder, 104 S. Ct. at 1487.

Keeton, 104 S. Ct. at 1480.
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interest in adjudicating the dispute in resolving the question of the fairness of subjecting the defendant to New Hampshire jurisdiction." But the discussion of New
Hampshire's interest is focused on the propriety of subjecting a libel defendant
to the jurisdiction of the forum, assuming that the minimum contacts test has been
met. 91 Nowhere in Keeton does the court say that a state's interest in adjudicating
the controversy can substitute for the presence of a relation between the defendant
and the forum.
Helicopteros involved a wrongful death suit brought by United States citizens
against a Columbian corporation which had owned a helicopter that crashed in
Peru, killing four American employees. In sustaining jurisdiction the Texas Supreme
Court relied heavily on Texas' interest in adjudicating the dispute and on the plaintiff's interest.92 In deciding whether Texas could exercise jurisdiction over the foreign
9 The Court of Appeals expressed the view that New Hampshire's "interest" in asserting
jurisdiction over plaintiff's multistate claim was minimal. We agree that the "fairness" of
haling respondent into a New Hampshire court depends to some extent on whether respondent's activities relating to New Hampshire are such as to give that State a legitimate interest
in holding respondent answerable on a claim related to those activities. See World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292, 100 S.Ct. 559, 564, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980);
McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S.Ct. 199, 201, 2 L.Ed.2d
223 (1957). But insofar as the State's "interest" in adjudicating the dispute is a part of the
Fourteenth Amendment due process equation, as a surrogate for some of the factors already
mentioned, see Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 702-703 n. 10,
102 S.Ct. 2099, 2104-2105 n. 10, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982), we think the interest is sufficient.
Keeton, 104 S. Ct. at 1479.
" New Hampshire has clearly expressed its interest in protecting such persons from libel,
as well as in safeguarding its populace from falsehoods. Its criminal defamation statute bears
no restriction to libels of which residents are the victim. Moreover, in 1971 New Hampshire
specifically deleted from its long-arm statute the requirement that a tort be committed "against
a resident of New Hampshire."
New Hampshire also has a substantial interest in cooperating with other States, through
the "single publication rule," to provide a forum for efficiently litigating all issues and damage
claims arising out of a libel in a unitary proceeding. This rule reduces the potential serious
drain of libel cases on judicial resources. It also serves to protect defendants from harassment
resulting from multiple suits. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577A, comment f (1977). In
sum, the combination of New Hampshire's interest in redressing injuries that occur within
the state and its interest in cooperating with other States in the application of the "single
publication rule" demonstrate the propriety of requiring respondent to answer to a multistate
libel action in New Hampshire.
Keeton, 104 S. Ct. at 1479-80.
92 Helicopteros, 638 S.W.2d 870, 873 (Tx. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1868 (1984). In reversing the
Texas court, the Supreme Court observed:
It is undisputed that Helicol does not have a place of business in Texas and never has been
licensed to do business in the State. Basically, Helicol's contracts [sic] with Texas consisted
of sending its chief executive officer to Houston for a contract-negotiation session; accepting
into its New York bank account checks drawn on a Houston bank; purchasing helicopters,
equipment, and training services from Bell Helicopter for substantial sums; and sending personnel to Bell's facilities in Fort Worth for training.
Helicopteros, 104 S. Ct. at 1873. It should be noted that the Court held that Helicopteros' purchases
in Texas did not constitute sufficient contacts because of a 1923 case, Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis
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corporation, the Court went into a detailed analysis of the corporation's activities
vis-a-vis Texas.
Thus, the justification of Gillette must fail because it is based on an interstate
venue theory focused on the state's interest in adjudication and on plaintiff's convenience. Rather, the jurisdictional question should be phrased in terms of the relationship among the individual party, the forum, and the litigation. If the Court
would use interstate venue in deciding the jurisdictional question with regards to
a plaintiff's class, the focus would be on the forum's interest in adjudicating the
lawsuit rather than on each plaintiff's relationship with the forum. In the nationwide state class action each individual party's situation, here the plaintiffs, must
be weighed separately. The jurisdictional question in the nationwide state class action must concern itself with each plaintiff individually rather than with the class
as a whole." Since Hanson v. Denckla,94 the Court has not taken an expansive
view of jurisdiction and it is unlikely to in the Gillette situation. The plaintiff's
defense of the nationwide state class action on the basis of one state sharing in
a national duty of all the states to adjudicate does not fit the Court's jurisdictional
theory which requires a relation between the party and the forum.
VI.

RECENT DEVELOPIMNTS: THE C~unQuE OF TiE COURT'S USE OF
FEDERALISM AND IRELAND

The Court's decision in InsuranceCorp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites
de Guinde9" contains a theoretical discussion of jurisdiction which relates directly
to the question of whether federalism concerns defeat jurisdiction in a Gillette situation. Ireland can be seen as a response to academic criticism of World-Wide
Volkswagen. Commentators stated that the Court had acted without constitutional
justification. Professor Braveman argues that the Court's concern about jurisdictional intrusions into the affairs of a sovereign state is based on a perception of
is difficult to imagine how the exercise
a problem where actually none exists: "[i]t
of judicial jurisdiction could actually intrude on the sovereignty of a sister state
....",9 In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court was unable to identify adequately
an real threat to New York's power, dignity, or authority created by Oklahoma's
exercise of judicial authority over New York citizens.97 Moreover, any individual

Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516. Such a reliance on precedent without logical justification can be criticized.
Why should a 1923 case, decided prior to InternationalShoe, control a decision involving international
commerce carried out under contemporary conditions in 1984?
" See Calder, 104 S. Ct. 1482 (employees' contacts had to be considered separately from the
employer's).
" Hanson, 357 U.S. 235. Since Hanson, the Court has upheld jurisdiction only in Keeton and
Calder.
95Ireland, 456 U.S. 694.
96 Braveman, InterstateFederalism and Personal Jurisdiction, 33 SYR cusE L. REv. 533, 542-43

(1982).
97

Id.
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can waive lack of personal jurisdiction.9" "It is somewhat illogical to assert that
the exercise of judicial authority by a forum state threatens the sovereign interests
of a sister state and then allow any individual to waive those interests simply by
submitting to the forum's jurisdiction." 99
Professor Martin H. Redish, in his article, Due Process, Federalism and Personal Jurisdiction:A Theoretical Evaluation,' argued that there is no basis in
the Constitution to deprive a state of jurisdiction on federalism grounds:
Although the Court has assumed since the time of Pennoyer that the due process
clause embodies such notions of federalism, it has relied on neither the language,
history, nor policy of the due process clause to justify its construction. Indeed,
such notions of federalism as limitations on the reach of personal jurisdiction are
found nowhere in the body of the Constitution, much less in the terms of the due
process clause.' 0'
Because of the lack of any constitutional basis to apply federalism concerns to
the states through the due process clause, "the only concern of a principled due
process jurisdictional analysis should be the avoidance of inconvenience to the
defendant." 02
The Court in Ireland, answered the academic criticisms and reworked jurisdictional theory. A mining company had purchased business interruption insurance
from foreign insurers. The company, contending that a certain loss was covered
under its policies, brought suit against the foreign insurers who had refused to pay.
These insurers moved to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction but failed
to respond to discovery concerning that defense. As a sanction for failure to respond to discovery the company was ordered to subject itself to in personam
jurisdiction.' 3 Insurers then presented the following arguments to the Court:
Petitioners urge that such an application of the Rule would violate Due Process: If a court does not have jurisdiction over a party, then it may not create
the jurisdiction by judicial fiat. They contend also that until a court has jurisdiction over a party, that party need not comply with orders of the court; failure
to comply, therefore, cannot provide the ground for a sanction.' 0'
Justice White, in writing for the Court, rejected this argument and upheld the
district court's actions. In doing so, the Court contrasted subject matter and personal jurisdiction. The former is a function of a court's power, while the latter
is a protection of an individual liberty interest:
91See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1).
9'Braveman, supra note 96, at 554.
"I Redish, Due Process,Federalism, and PersonalJurisdiction:A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw.
U.L. REv. 1112 (1981).
101Id. at 1114.
"'
Id. at 1137.
"0 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(a).
,0,
Ireland, 456 U.S. at 696.
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The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction flows not from Art.
III, but from the Due Process Clause. The personal jurisdiction requirement
recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on
judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty.105
In a footnote to the above passage, the Court discussed the relation between

federalism and the individual liberty interest involved. The footnote, although
lengthy, should be read in its entirety because it is the Court's only explicit discus-

sion of the constitutional source of the requirement of personal jurisdiction:
It is true that we have stated that the requirement of personal jurisdiction,
as applied to state courts, reflects an element of federalism and the character of
state sovereignty vis-a-vis other states. For example, in World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-292 (1980), we stated:
"[A] state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
only so long as there exist 'minimum contacts' between the defendant and the forum
State. The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform two related,
but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of
litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States,
through their courts do not reach beyond the limits imposed on them by their status
as coequal sovereigns in a federal system." (citations omitted)
Contrary to the suggestion of Justice Powell, post, at 713-714, our holding today
does not alter the requirement that there be "minimum contacts" between the nonresident defendant and the forum State. Rather, our holding deals with how the
facts needed to show those "minimum contacts" can be established when a defendant fails to comply with court-ordered discovery. The restriction on state sovereign
power described in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., however, must be seen as
ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process
Clause. That Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement
and the Clause itself makes no mention of federalism concerns. Furthermore, if
the federalism concept operated as an independent restriction on the sovereign power
of the court, it would not be possible to waive the personal jurisdiction requirement: Individual actions cannot change the powers of sovereignty, although the
individual can subject himself to powers from which he may otherwise be
protected."06
Because personal jurisdiction represents an individual right, it may be waived. 07
To have "minimum contacts" with a forum is therefore to have done enough with
relation to the sovereign to allow that sovereign to adjudicate your interests.
Minimum contacts is one way to meet the constitutional prohibition against being
forced to subject oneself to a sovereign to which one has no relation. Other ways
to overcome the prohibition are by filing a general appearance, contracting in adId. at 702 n.10.
Id. at 702-03.
Id. at 703.
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vance, waiving by failure to object, or failure to comply with discovery rules. 08
The problem with a court exercising jurisdiction over someone with no minimum
contacts with the forum is that it deprives that person of a "due process" right
not to have his interests adjudicated by a sovereign with which he has no relation.
Integrating Irelandwith the prior cases is difficult. World- Wide Volkswagen's
statement that the due process clauses act "as an instrument of interstate
federalism"' 0 9 speaks in terms of the relationship between the states rather than
the liberty interest of the individual. It is doubtful that the Court in Ireland meant
to jettison all its concerns with federalism. One hypothesis is that the individual's
due process rights have two components: convenience and federalism. The latter
component of due process is a personal right to have a case tried in accordance
with "our system of federalism." Unless the individual consents to a state's exercise of sovereignty, that state cannot adjudicate his rights. The "minimum contacts" test that is satisfied where the party "purposefully avails itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum state"" 0 operates as a test of consent
to jurisdiction.
VII.

APPLICATION To Gillette

Applying the jurisdictional analysis and the specific precedent to Gillette, we
conclude Illinois cannot adversely adjudicate someone's rights without that person's consent or some minimal relation to the forum. The class action, therefore,
cannot bind the class members from suing again. To do so would deprive the class
member of his right to sue without due process of law."' A binding effect on a
class member cannot be justified on a basis of shared judicial responsibility because
each sovereign unit must have its own justification in exercising jurisdiction over
a party. Neither can it be justified by efficiency because one's due process rights
cannot be taken away on such grounds.
It can be argued that the opt-out right works as a consent. The failure to opt
out, however, is not an affirmative consent to jurisdiction. There is no submission
to the forum that operates to justify personal jurisdiction." 2 Thus, under the Court's
,o Id. at 703-05.

,o World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 294.
,' Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253; World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297; Shaffer, 433 U.S. at
216; Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 94 (1978).
Logan, 455 U.S. 422.
,,2 The law of contract states that failure to respond to an offer does not operate as a consent.
The failure to opt-out, then, should not operate as a waiver of jurisdiction. "It is an old maxim that
silence gives consent; but this is not a rule of law. It is certain that, if the only facts are that A makes
an offer to B and B remains silent, there is no contract." I CoBIN, COMRACTS § 72, at 304-05 (1963).
Ireland, however, could be used to bolster the opt-out justification. There the defendants failed to.
produce documents pursuant to discovery and did not affirmatively consent to jurisdiction. A discovery
order, however, can be distinguished from an opt-out notice which may not have been received. The
discovery order, by contrast, operates at a later period in the lawsuit after parties have been brought
into court by service of process.
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formulation of the jurisdictional issue, a single state cannot bind a nationwide class.
Such an analysis fits with prior precedent, which required some nexus with the
state in order to allow a nationwide class action.
This conclusion, however, leads to another-that there is at present no forum
that can give adequate relief to a class injured by a nationwide scheme. If the inability to bind class members requires a rejection of the class action, then that
also would be a violation of due process. It must be remembered that the fourteenth amendment does not prohibit abstract violations of due process, but instead
reads "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.""11 3 A denial of the class action forum would also deprive a
class member of a right to relief.
If the class in Gillette is allowed, a plaintiff may gain $7.95. If the class is
disallowed, he may not-and probably will not, since no other suit has been filedgain anything. Here, it is the defendant, Gillette, that is arguing against class certification. If we assume that the Gillette Corporation is motivated by financial rather
than pro bono considerations, we must assume that Gillette is arguing against the
multistate class because it expects to pay out less money with a smaller class than
a larger one. At least according to Gillette's expectations, the class will have more
property by a violation of due process than it would if its due process rights were
being observed.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

We are left with a paradox and no good solution. If the class decision would
bind the parties, a state cannot constitutionally entertain a nationwide class action.
Yet, after Snyder and Zahn, only a state court can entertain such an action and
if there is no nationwide class, relief cannot be granted those harmed by a nationwide practice. There are two possible solutions: The first is a one-way class action,
in which nonresidents would benefit from a decision but would not be barred by
adverse results, or have Congress provide a federal forum. A state one-way action,
although constitutional, is unfair to the defendant. The procedure does not meet
a basic goal of any judicial system-the resolution of a controversy. No matter
what the decision, out-of-state plaintiffs have another chance to get relief. The
defendant can only lose. Secondly, Congress could pass a nationwide consumer
practices act, as it has legislated federal securities and consumer warranties acts.
This solution would avoid the jurisdictional difficulties with state adjudication, provide for fairness to the defendant, and definitely resolve the controversy. Until
Congress acts, however, the courts of a single state will attempt to adjudicate a
problem of nationwide scope.

"'

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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